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Over three centuries ago, a new technology suddenly increased the amount and 
frequency of available information. Might such “Big Data” have disrupted the 
causal relationships linking economic growth and innovation? Previous research 
has affirmed that a society’s economic success during the Industrial Revolution 
depended on its institutions. Here we examine the hypothesis that by allowing 
people to cooperate more easily with one another, language standardization 
raised a society’s rate of innovation. As a result, the region could attract the 
resources needed to grow more rapidly. Empirical tests with 117 innovations and 
251 Western cities suggest that the presence of a standardized tongue helps to 
explain the burst of innovation and growth observed between 1700 and 1850. 
Moreover, once one has accounted for language standardization, institutional 
quality has little further power to explain economic progress.  
  
1. The Question and Its Importance 
Does economic growth stimulate innovation or does causality run rather from innovation 
to economic growth? Over most of the past 2,000 years, the evidence tends to support the 
position that economic growth has led to innovation. In China, the re-establishment of 
internal peace under a centralized administration around 600 AD led to a doubling of 
population over the following five centuries.1 During the latter part of this period, under 
the Song dynasty, the Chinese invented gunpowder, paper money and the mariner’s 
compass.2 However, following the fall of Northern Song capital to outside invaders in 1127 
and the subsequent devastation of much of northern China, such innovation virtually ceased 
in China until the present day. As for Europe, the invention of the caravel, typography and 
                                                
1 Ebrey (1996, 159). 
2 Temple (2007, 250, 131, 164). 
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effective firearms came in the fifteenth century, during the region’s demographic recovery 
from the Black Death. Subsequently, lower temperatures during the Little Ice Age after the 
mid-sixteenth century brought demographic stagnation and a simultaneous dearth of 
important innovations (Mokyr, 1990, 79). 
In the eighteenth century, however, there seems to have been a disruption to this long-
standing pattern of causality running from growth to innovation. Between 1700 and 1850, 
as mean temperatures rose, the population of Western Europe doubled.3 Simultaneously 
however, there was a virtual explosion of innovation in the West. Historians of technology 
have designated over one hundred new techniques during this period as important 
technological contributions (Dudley, 2017). Did demographic growth caused in part by a 
milder climate gradually create markets for the output of would-be inventors?  Or did new 
technologies suddenly allow given resources to support a much larger population? If so, 
what was it that generated the prolonged outburst of innovation? 
The direction of causality is important for policy. If growth tends to lead automatically to 
productivity-enhancing innovations, then economic policies should presumably be directed 
primarily toward replicating institutions that encourage investment and the creation of 
employment opportunities, with the assurance that productivity improvements will follow. 
If, however, three centuries ago, innovation suddenly became the principal source of an 
economy’s prosperity, it is essential to identify the factors that favor the emergence of new 
technologies.  
The century and a half of the First Industrial Revolution, from 1700 to 1850, is an ideal 
period for testing causal relations in this case, since both innovation and economic growth 
varied sufficiently across regions in the West to permit identification of cause and effect. 
At the same time, innovations were sufficiently numerous and biographical information 
detailed enough to situate new developments both chronologically and geographically. 
Moreover, this period is pertinent if we wish to abstract from the effects of policy since, as 
MacLeod and Nuvolari (2016) have argued, before the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, inventors were poorly protected by their countries’ legal systems.  
                                                
3 Estimate based on Maddison (2007, 376). 
3 
 
The next section of this paper outlines the main features of economic growth and 
innovation over the period from 1700 to 1850. We show that per-capita economic growth 
across countries in the West was highly correlated with rates of urbanization. Moreover, 
innovation was geographically highly concentrated, with over 90 percent of important new 
technologies originating in three clusters of cities in in Great Britain, northern France and 
the north-eastern United States.  
To unravel the linkages between urbanization and innovation, Section 3 proposes a two-
step estimation procedure. In the first step, the paper examines the factors that favored 
innovation. Previous research has indicated that a society’s success in developing new 
technologies depended on its institutions and on the factor prices it faced (North, 1990; 
Allen, 2009). However, recent studies suggest that the degree of language standardization 
may also have played an important role in generating innovation. Sasaki (2017) shows that 
the timing of the acquisition of the printing press explains the great dispersion in the dates 
of language standardization across the regions of Western Europe. Dudley (2017) provides 
evidence that the date of language standardization in turn explains the timing of innovation 
in European cities.  
The great majority of European cities and towns produced no innovations whatsoever 
during the Industrial Revolution. In the first step of the present paper, therefore, we use an 
estimation procedure that takes account of the large number of localities with zero 
innovations. In the second step, we inquire whether the number of innovations so explained 
can account for observed differences in rates of growth of urban population during the 
Industrial Revolution. Here, the question is whether innovations played a role distinct from 
those of other influences on a city’s demographic growth. A simple variant of the gravity 
model suggests that urban regions which have been able to innovate will be able to attract 
qualified workers in order to produce additional innovations and create downstream 
industries that employ the new technologies, attracting capital and labor from other centers. 
To test this model, in Section 4 we divide the sample of innovations identified by leading 
economic historians into two groups. A first group comprises those with two or more 
inventors – “cooperative innovations” (CIs); for example, the atmospheric steam engine of 
Thomas Newcomen and John Calley, a breakthrough in mechanization. A second group is 
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made up of those with a single inventor – “non-cooperative innovations” (NCIs); for 
example, John Kay’s flying shuttle, a relatively minor improvement in the hand loom. The 
data set consists of observations for 251 European and North American cities, at intervals 
of 50 years from 1700 to 1850. 
The results of the first step confirm that language standardization was important as an 
explanation for both types of innovation, but particularly critical for cooperative 
innovation. Moreover, there is evidence of path dependency or hysteresis, whereby a 
combination of past experience and the passage of time raised the capacity of a city to 
generate cooperative innovation. 
In the second step, the explanation of population growth in a given city, care is necessary 
to take account of feedback from past growth to subsequent innovation. Once this 
adjustment is made, there is strong evidence of innovation clustering, whereby language 
standardization promoted CI in one city that led in turn to further innovation with growth-
simulating effects in the same city, along with positive externalities for other cities in the 
same country. We found no such effects for NCIs. 
The results provide strong empirical support for Alex Pentland’s (2014) argument that 
growth-enhancing innovation depends on “idea flow” and “social learning”. However, 
these forces were already present and challenging policy makers some three centuries ago, 
when the rapid standardization of the national languages of Britain and France confronted 






2. Cities and the Industrial Revolution 
Today we are used to thinking of industrialization as primarily an urban phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, several economic historians of a previous generation concluded that the city 
did not play an important role in the mechanization of Western industry. For example, Paul 
Bairoch (1988, 256) stated that “the dominant urban centers in English society at the start 
of the eighteenth century made no significant contribution to the initial phases of the 
Industrial Revolution.”4 However, a detailed examination of the historical evidence 
suggests that we should avoid making any hasty conclusions about the relationship between 
the city and technological change. 
Figure 1 presents some of the essential facts concerning urbanization and economic growth 
between 1700 and 1850 for nine present-day European states. Across the West during this 
period, there were considerable differences in rates of increase in per-capita GDP. As the 
vertical axis shows, there was rapid growth of income levels in the USA, Great Britain, 
France and Switzerland. However, output per person increased considerably less rapidly in 
the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium.5 The trend line indicates that these output growth rates 
were highly correlated with a simple measure of urbanization; namely, the difference 
between the rate of population growth in cities of more than 5,000 inhabitants and the 
population growth rate of the country as a whole. In the four countries with the fastest GDP 
growth, this difference was positive, indicating growing urbanization. However, in the 
more slowly growing Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Denmark, the population of the cities 
increased less rapidly than that of the countryside and the smallest towns. In other words, 
in these four economies, urbanization rates were negative, indicating disurbanization!  
As mentioned above, most previous explanations of the acceleration in economic growth 
during the Industrial Revolution fall into one or the other of two groups. One set of studies 
emphasizes the forces on the supply side that protected entrepreneurs from arbitrary 
                                                
4 Landes (1965) and Flinn (1966) were of similar opinions. 






appropriation of their assets and the streams of income generated therefrom. North (1990, 
3) stressed the importance of institutions that reinforce the rights of property owners and 
assure the enforcement of contracts. Similarly, for Mokyr (2002, 34), in order to innovate, 
a society must have an ideology that favors new ways of practical thinking.6 Landes (1998, 
219) widened the definition of contributing institutions to include Britain's individualistic 
culture. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, 82) pointed to the emergence of ‘inclusive’ 
political institutions as the keys to Britain’s economic success.7 
A second group of authors pointed to the unique constellation of factor prices in Britain 
and America that created a demand for the mechanization of manufacturing. With Britain’s 
rising labor costs and abundant energy in the form of coal and falling water, Allen (2009, 
105, 173-175) suggested, it became profitable to replace skilled labor with powered 
machinery. In Asia, Pomeranz (2000, 62-63) argued, abundant labor and scarce alternative 
power sources, precluded the application of such energy-using technologies. 
The data on urbanization and economic growth pose challenges for both of these 
approaches. Consider first the importance of institutions, with the help of Figure 1. Great 
Britain and the Netherlands each had individualistic institutions that favored property 
owners, providing them with a strong voice in government policy. Yet between 1700 and 
1850, while Britain experienced rapid growth and urbanization, the Netherlands suffered 
through stagnation and disurbanization. Or compare Italy, with its multiple autocratic 
regimes, to the Dutch federal republic. Here were two regions with quite different 
institutions, but both societies experienced slow growth and disurbanization. An analogous 
challenge arises when we consider factor endowments. Both France and Italy had relatively 
abundant labor and scarce energy resources. Yet in France over the century and a half after 
                                                
6 Ogilvy and Carus (2014) offer a critical review of the institutional approach to economic growth. 
7 Recent attempts to test this institutions hypothesis empirically have yielded some intriguing results. 
Gragnolati and Nuvolari (2018) find evidence of knowledge spillovers at the regional level in Britain in 
innovating cities during the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, Donges, Meier and Silva (2018) show that for 
a sample of German regions, the length of French occupation between 1790 and 1815 explains innovation 





1700, there was significant growth in income levels and increasing urbanization, while in 
Italy there was stagnation by both measures.  
Some consideration would appear to be missing in the institutional and factor-endowment 
approaches to explaining the Industrial Revolution. As is well known, there was a third 
important dimension to economic change between 1700 and 1850; namely, a series of 
technological improvements that raised worker productivity. Historians of technology have 
identified over 100 important innovations during this period. Indeed, one may identify 117 
of these innovations as particularly significant, each breakthrough being cited by at least 
two prominent economic historians.8 The area in which these innovations were developed 
constitutes an “innovation space” that accounted for virtually all of the world’s important 
innovations over a century and a half.9  
It is helpful to separate these innovations into two categories, as summarized in Table 1. 
One group comprises 54 technologies that may be termed cooperative innovations (CI). In 
each case, the available biographical information permits the identification of both a 
principal and at least one unrelated collaborator who made a significant contribution (see 
Dudley, 2012, chs. 2-4). From the biographies, one may suggest that had the other 
individual(s) not participated in the development of these innovations, the technology 
would not have been successful. These CIs tended to be relatively complex, requiring the 
integration of distinct areas of specialization. Prominent examples are the atmospheric 
steam engine of Thomas Newcomen and John Calley, the production of sodium carbonate 
from salt, discovered by Nicolas Leblanc and Jean d’Arcet, and interchangeable parts, 
developed by Simeon North and John Hall. 
The second category consists of non-cooperative innovations (NCIs), those for which only 
a single inventor may be identified. These inventions tended to be simple conceptually; for 
example, John Kay’s flying shuttle, James Hargreaves’s spinning jenny and Edmund 
                                                
8	The authors in question were Donald Cardwell (1991) of Britain, Maurice Daumas (1979) and his 
associates of France, Joel Mokyr (1990) born in the Netherlands and living in the United States, and Akos 
Paulinyi (1989), born in Hungary and residing in Germany. Of the total number of innovations, 87 were 
mentioned by at least two of these authors. The 30 others were noted by only one of them but were also 
cited by the Encyclopedia Britannica. 	
9 In addition to Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, German, Switzerland and Denmark, 
the European portion of this space is defined to include northern Italy and western Austria. 
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Cartwright’s wooden power loom. Like the cooperative innovators, these independent 
inventors depended on trust from networks of suppliers, employees and customers. That 
this trust was not always forthcoming is shown by the difficulties of the three inventors in 
persuading users of their ideas to compensate them for their efforts. 
A convenient measure of innovative success is the number of innovations per person within 
the present-day boundaries of the nine countries of Figure 2. It will be observed that the 
four countries with the highest growth rates of per-capita output also had the most 
innovations per capita. In addition, three of these states – the United Kingdom, the USA 
and France – were the only countries with CIs. It might also be noted that these same three 
states also had the most NCIs. What did these countries have in common that distinguished 
them from their less innovative and more slowly growing neighbors? 
To answer this question, it is important to examine the area in which each of the 117 
innovations originated. Our set of potential innovating regions had 251 urban centers with 
populations over 5,000. Yet all of the selected innovations were concentrated in the areas 
surrounding only 29 of these cities, as Figure 3 indicates. It is perhaps not surprising that 
the two largest cities by far, the national capitals of England and France, both with 
populations of one-half million or more in 1700, each had ten or more innovations over the 
following century and a half. However, in 1700 Birmingham and Manchester each had a 
population of well under 10,000. Yet together these two cities had more innovations than 
the two capitals combined between 1700 and 1850.  
A closer look at the map in Figure 3 suggests why these particular cities were so innovative. 
Over 90 percent of the European innovations were generated within two clusters, each 
roughly 100 miles (160 km) wide and 400 miles (640 km) long in Great Britain and France. 
One of these regions stretched from the London area to southern Scotland; the other 
extended from Lyon through Paris to Rouen. A similar oval along the northeast coast of 
the United States, from Boston to Philadelphia, accounts for all of the innovations outside 
Europe. During the century and a half after 1700, something was occurring within these 
clusters of innovation that had not yet touched the rest of the world.   
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Together, these figures suggest three requirements of a theory to explain the relationship 
between economic growth, urbanization and innovation during the Industrial Revolution. 
First, the model should explain the sudden appearance of a great dispersion in rates of 
urbanization and economic growth across Western Europe and its North-American 
offshoot in the eighteenth century. Second, the hypothesis should explain an even greater 
dispersion in rates of innovation in these same regions during the century and a half after 
1700. Finally, the theory should explain why the 54 cooperative innovations developed 
during this long period – breakthroughs such as the atmospheric steam engine, industrial 
chemicals and interchangeable parts – all originated in Great Britain, in northern France or 




3. Modeling Innovation and Growth 
We have seen that almost all of the world’s innovations between 1700 and 1850 were 
concentrated in three narrow bands of territory in northwestern Europe and North America 
(see Figure 3). What did people in these three clusters have that was missing, at least 
temporarily, in the rest of the world? 
(a) Language and Innovation 
In Britain in the late Middle Ages, there were four major families of spoken English, 
corresponding roughly to four Anglo-Saxon kingdoms that had existed some six centuries 
earlier. In the north-east was the Northern dialect group, in the center the Midlands group, 
in the south-west the Western group and in the south-east the East-Anglian group (Crystal, 
324-325). The spoken language in the area surrounding the capital, London, had been 
strongly influenced by migration from the Midlands. After 1430, this dialect of the Home 
Counties formed the basis for the written usage in government documents that became 
known as the “Chancery Standard” (Crystal, 2003, 54). Nevertheless, in the early 
seventeenth century, people from different regions in England had difficulty understanding 
one another’s speech (Freeborn, 1992, 137). In France, a region speaking francien, the 
dialect of Paris, had been created by the conquests of the French monarchy during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Parisian dialect would be given official status in 
written French by the decree of Villers-Cotterêts of 1539 (Robert, 1980; 1920). However, 
in seventeenth-century France, only 30 miles (48 km) north of Paris, Louis XIV was unable 
to understand a crowd complaining of food shortages (Bell, 2001, 82). In Brittany and 
south of the Loire, people still spoke dialects of languages quite distinct from French.  
In the last half of the fifteenth century, as Benedict Anderson (2006) observed, Britain, 
France and the neighboring states of Western Europe were disturbed by a technological 
shock; namely, the printing press of Johann Gutenberg and Johann Fust. Sasaki (2018) has 
shown that the invention of metal movable typography triggered a process by which, 
through the actions of printers and their governments, spoken vernaculars across Europe 
gradually acquired standardized written forms. However, because of delays in the diffusion 
of the new technology, the timing of this standardization process varied from one language 
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to another. By the early eighteenth century, Great Britain, France and their offshoots were 
the first societies to have monolingual vernacular dictionaries.10 Might these countries’ 
early lead by this measure of language standardization help explain their precocity in 
experiencing rapid economic and urban growth, as displayed in Figure 1? 
Support for this hypothesis is suggested by the correlation coefficients displayed in Table 
2. During a given half century between 1700 and 1850, the number of years since the 
publication of a region’s first monolingual dictionary was positively correlated with the 
number of innovations that its residents developed. These innovations were in turn highly 
correlated with the increase in the city’s population in the same period. Leaving aside the 
directions of causality for the moment, let us separate the process by which a city’s 
economy grows conceptually into two steps. In the first step, residents of the city cooperate 
with residents of other cities to create innovations, of which a certain fraction are applied 
to production in that city. In the second step, the population of the city grows, in part 
through the natural increase in its original population, and in part through net immigration 
of workers attracted by new employment opportunities created by these innovations. 
(b)  The Innovation Equation 
Consider first the innovation process in city i. Assume that innovation occurs when an 
individual from that city combines his or her knowledge with the expertise of someone 
from another city who speaks the same language. In a given period, let the number of 
innovations in the city then be expressed as a function of the exponents of its population, 
ni, and the number of years, si, since it adopted the same standardized language as other 
cities in its language area.  
 𝑦" = exp 𝐶 + 𝛽*𝑛" + 𝛽,𝑠" .  
                                                
10 Plausible dates for the first monolingual dictionary in our sample of ten present-day countries are: 
England, 1658; France north of the Loire and Belgium and Switzerland (French), 1680; France south of the 
Loire, 1815; Scotland, 1707; United States, 1728; Germany and Switzerland (German), 1786; Denmark 
(1833); Netherlands and Belgium (Flemish), 1864; Austria (1868). See Dudley (2017, Table 2). 
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This equation expresses the expected number of innovations produced in a given period 
after the introduction of a standardized language in a form that may be inserted into a 
Poisson distribution.  
The next step is to integrate this networking approach into a specification that incorporates 
the supply and demand approaches used in previous studies. Define the dependent variable 
as the number of innovations of a given type that occurred in the region of a given city 
during each half-century between 1700 and 1849. Since such innovations may be 
considered rare events, we should use an estimation method appropriate for count data. The 
variance of this variable in our sample (0.182) is considerably greater than the mean 
(0.065). To allow for this over-dispersion (a greater frequency of zero observations than 
the Poisson distribution assumes), a negative-binomial specification is appropriate, since it 
has an extra parameter to adjust the variance separately from the mean.  
There is another characteristic of the data to take into account. Of the 753 observations, 
there are only 22 with positive values for the number of cooperative innovations. For non-
cooperative innovations, the corresponding figure is 34. The zero-inflated negative 
binomial model provides a way of modeling such excess zeros, in addition to allowing for 
over-dispersion. For each observation, there are two possible data generation processes. 
For observation i, the first process is chosen with probability φi and the second with 
probability 1- φi . The first process generates only zeros using a logit model. A possible 
determinant of this selection is the number of innovations in the preceding period, an 
indication of dynamic learning effects. The second process generates counts from a 
negative binomial model, where xi is a vector of covariates.  
In general:  
 Iijt = 0                                       with probability φi  
         (1) 
                 = exp (Xijtβ + 𝜀"/0 + uijt)      with probability 1-φi , 
 
where Iijt is the expected number of innovations in city i of type j (cooperative or non-
cooperative) in period t, Xijt is a vector of explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters, 
𝜀"/0 is a random variable and exp (𝑢"/0) follows a gamma distribution. 
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(c) The Growth Equation 
Turn now to the growth process. Let us assume that the change in population in city i during 
period t is a function of its initial population, the number of innovations in that city during 
the period, and the number of innovations in other cities of the same country, the latter 
weighted by the distance from the city in question. 
∆𝑃"0 = 	𝛼*𝑃"6 + 𝛼,𝐼"0 	+ 	𝛾 𝑑"/𝐼/0/:" +	𝒁"0𝜹 +	𝑣"0                            (2) 
where  Pi0 = population of city i in period 0, 
 Iit  = number of innovations in city i in period t 
 dij  = distance between cities i and j. 
 𝒁"0	= vector of other explanatory variables. 
Of particular interest are the parameters α2, a measure of the impact of innovation on 
economic growth and γ, which captures the externalities whereby all cities in a network 
benefit from the innovations in other cities in the same country. 
In his study of the implications of “Big Data”, Alex Pentland (2014) has speculated on the 
social implications of recent technologies that have made information available in 
unprecedented quantities and frequencies of observation. Thanks to the multiplication of 
personal information devices and the ubiquity of WiFi service, individuals now have 
instantaneous access to the discoveries of others – “idea flow” on a planetary scale. As a 
result, we now have the possibility of collectively rapidly acquiring the experience of one 
another – “social learning”. However, is this technological shock unique, or did something 
similar happen some three centuries ago in Britain and France with the spread of 
standardized languages, as Anderson (2006, 40-46) has argued? Estimation of the 





4. An Empirical Test 
The previous section distinguished two steps in the development of innovation growth 
clusters during the Industrial Revolution. First, new technologies were discovered in a 
number of urban zones within certain regions of Western Europe and the northeastern part 
of North America; second, subsequent application of these technologies generated 
employment opportunities that attracted additional workers and their families to the 
innovating cities. 
Table 3 presents an analysis of the first step, applying the zero-inflated negative binomial 
specification of equation (1) to explain the number of innovations in a given city in a given 
half-century. The first column shows estimates to explain all 117 innovations, while the 
second and third columns are assigned to estimates for the 54 cooperative innovations (CIs) 
and the 63 non-cooperative innovations (NCIs) respectively. Consider first the lower part 
of the table, which presents the determinants of whether or not a given city lacks the 
potential for innovation. The lagged number of innovations, a measure of innovation 
experience in the city during the preceding half-century decreased the probability that it 
could not innovate; i.e., increased the probability that it could innovate. This result could 
be interpreted as evidence of path-dependent “social learning” at the level of the individual 
urban region. Note, however, that although capital cities are more likely to have NCIs, they 
were less likely to have CIs. In other words, the probability of collective innovation was 
lower and that of individual innovation higher in national political centers. A possible 
explanation is that before the development of urban transport and the telephone, there were 
diseconomies of scale to collaboration in megacities such as Paris and London, due to the 
higher cost of interaction between potential partners (see Bairoch, 1988, 279). Individual 
inventors, however, may have been more likely to find the market inputs they needed in 
the capitals. The country dummy variables may perhaps be interpreted as a rough measure 
of the importance of their national institutions. If so, British and French institutions would 
seem to have had no significant impact on whether a city was able to innovate, once one 
takes account of language. Another way of saying the same thing is that language would 
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appear to be by far the most important component of institutional differences between 
countries. 
The upper section of Table 3 explains the number of innovations in each potential 
innovating city. The presence of a standardized language had a very significant positive 
impact for both categories of innovations, but especially so for CIs. Having a common 
tongue would appear to have facilitated the communication and trust that were essential 
for successful collaboration between individuals from different cities. However, the 
distance between the two cities turned out to be not important, provided that they were both 
in the same language area. Having nearby coal deposits (within 50 km or 31 miles) was 
also an important factor favouring innovation in both cases, but particularly valuable for 
NCIs. As in the case of John Smeaton’s efficient atmospheric steam engine, or Jonathan 
Hornblower’s reciprocating compound steam engine, many of these NCIs were relatively 
minor adaptations of earlier cooperative breakthroughs in power-using technology. Note 
finally that the coefficients of the period variables for the two half-centuries after 1750 are 
significantly greater for CIs than for NCIs. Learning to innovate increased not only the 
potential to innovate but also the number of innovations among cities capable of developing 
new technologies. 
Consider now the second step, in which the dependent variable is the population increase 
in a given city within a given 50-year period, as specified in equation (2) above. Table 4 
presents least-squares robust-cluster estimates for the complete set of 117 innovations. In 
the first column, a simple fixed-effects specification reveals that the number of innovations 
in a given city was a key factor explaining the growth of its population. The more complete 
specification in the second column confirms this result. Innovations in other cities of the 
same country also had a significant positive impact on a city’s growth. 
As for other determinants of urban population increase, the second column shows that coal 
deposits and institutions specific to Great Britain or France had no significant independent 
impact. In addition, in both of these first two columns, a dummy variable for Paris during 
the half-century from 1750 to 1799 is negative and highly significant. The city had grown 
rapidly until 1789, but emigration of the nobility and the economic hardships due to the 
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Revolution led to an absolute fall in the city’s population over the following decade (Fierro, 
1996, 218-283). 
The single-stage results to this point are quite compatible with the simple correlation 
coefficients of the first column of Table 2, implying a positive relationship between 
innovation and urban growth. However, correlation need not imply causality. Accordingly, 
it is instructive to consider the top lines of the third and fourth columns of Table 4, in which 
the observed values of innovations have been replaced by their instrumented values from 
the first column of Table 3. Since these two-stage coefficients are significantly greater than 
those of the first columns of Table 4, it would appear that there was indeed feedback from 
population growth to innovation. However, as the earlier results suggested, for a given 
initial population, increasing a city’s size appears to have had a negative effect on 
innovation! 
Do all innovations have similar effects on economic growth? To answer this question, it is 
again helpful to divide the total set of innovations into two subsets, one made up of CIs 
and the other of NCIs. In the first two columns of Table 5, we see the single-stage estimates 
for the fixed-effects specification and the complete model when this distinction has been 
made. The second column shows that on average, a cooperative innovation in a city was 
accompanied by a population increase of some 38,000 during the same half century. In 
addition, such an innovation raised the population of all other cities in the same country by 
almost 3,000. A non-cooperative innovation was accompanied by a much smaller effect – 
an increase of about 8,000, with no spill-overs to other cities. Once again, coal deposits 
and variables representing the institutions of Great Britain and France had no independent 
positive effect. Indeed, non-innovating British cities actually grew significantly less than 
their continental counterparts, other things being equal. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 display the two-stage results for the same 
specifications, with CIs and NCIs instrumented from the second and third columns 
respectively of Table 3. The complete specification in the fourth column confirms the 
significant positive effects of CIs on population growth in both the innovating city and in 
other cities of the same country. As before, NCIs had considerably weaker effects, and then 
only in the city where they originated. Comparing the one- and two-stage results, we see 
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as in Table 4 a significantly greater value for the same-city effect in the latter, suggesting 
negative feedback from population growth to innovation. However, this finding applies 
only to CIs. 
Summarizing these results, we find first that once we take account of language 
standardization, we find little support for a rough measure of the importance of national 
institutions. Second, resource endowments in the form of coal deposits did have a 
significant effect on urban growth. However, this effect was indirect through encouraging 
the invention of energy-using technologies within feasible transport distance of coal. Third, 
and most importantly, language standardization had a strong positive effect on innovation, 
especially on the cooperative innovation that made possible the most important 
breakthrough technologies. The significant lagged effect of the previous generation’s 
inventions suggests some form of social learning, possibly through an increased 
willingness to trust strangers. The positive effect of innovation, particularly cooperative 
innovation, on urban population increase helps explain why the innovating countries had 
the highest rates of urbanization and per-capita income growth.  
In short, it is perhaps no exaggeration to suggest that the one change in institutions which 
helped make the Industrial Revolution possible was surely the standardization of the 






5. Endogeneity and Robustness 
 
Before we accept the results of the previous section suggesting a two-part flow of causality, 
one from language standardization to innovation and a second from innovation on to 
population growth, there are two important verifications to make. First is the problem of 
endogeneity: it is quite plausible that causality flows in the opposite direction in each 
relationship. In other words, it could be innovations that are leading to greater language 
standardization, or economic growth that is fostering innovation. Second is the question of 
robustness: the measures of statistical significance may be sensitive to minor changes in 
specification.  
(a) Endogeneity 
Consider first the impact of language standardization on innovation. The question of 
whether causality runs in the other direction is quite easily answered. Great Britain, France 
and the United States, the countries accounting for 95 percent of the innovations, all had 
standardized languages well before their first important innovations. In the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Italy, where there was virtually no significant innovation, standardization 
came after the end of the sample period.  
As for the population-growth equation, we saw in Tables 4 and 5 that the two-stage 
estimation yielded larger positive estimates for the effects of innovation on population 
increase than the single-stage procedure did. The results were similar whether we 
considered all innovations in the same city or only cooperative innovations. If there was 
feedback from urban population growth to innovation, therefore, such simultaneity would 
appear to have hampered the innovation process rather than promoting it. Quite possibly, 
with the transportation and communication technologies of the period, there were 
diseconomies of scale for urban regions above a certain size. 
(b) Robustness  
Consider now the robustness of the estimates to slight changes in specification, beginning 
with the innovation equation. The significant results for language standardization in Table 
3 proved insensitive to the omission of each of the other variables from the specification.  
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As for the population growth equation, the tests reported in Tables 6 and 7 the core 
variables appear in all of the specifications of each table. Each of the remaining tested 
variables appears in one specification for every possible combination of all but one of the 
other tested variables. The results indicate that the coefficients of both total innovations 
and cooperative innovations remain consistently positive and significant, whether for the 
same city or for other cities of the same country. The coefficients of the French Revolution 
and Capital city variables are similarly robust. However, estimates for non-cooperative 
innovations, like those for the country and time-period variables, are sensitive to the 
specification. 
In summary, an examination of the questions of endogeneity and robustness confirms the 
conclusions of the preceding analysis. For the century and a half after 1700, there is strong 
empirical evidence of a positive impact of language standardization on innovation. There 
was also a significant positive effect of that innovation, particularly cooperative innovation, 






In this paper, we have offered empirical support for the hypothesis that in the West between 
1700 and 1850, there was a chain of causality running from language standardization to 
innovation and onward to urban growth. In essence, underlying modern economic growth 
was a new information technology that allowed individuals to interact easily and 
confidently with one another.  
We suggested three requirements of a theory to explain the relationship between 
innovation, urbanization and economic growth during the Industrial Revolution. First, the 
model should explain the sudden appearance in the eighteenth century of a great dispersion 
in rates of urban growth and increases in per-capita income across Western Europe and 
North America.  Differences in factor endowments and economic and political institutions 
alone cannot help us understand this phenomenon. Rather, the evidence presented here 
suggests that an additional essential key to explaining this dispersion was the occurrence 
of unprecedented differences in rates of innovation between regions. 
Second, the hypothesis should explain the causes of this dispersion in rates of innovation 
during the century and a half after 1700. Coal deposits were an important determinant of 
regional economic growth during the Industrial Revolution, but only indirectly, through 
their impact on innovation activity. As Benedict Anderson (2006) and Yu Sasaki (2018) 
have argued, what was important for both Britain and France was the rapid spread of 
standardized vernaculars, a century or more in advance of other nations. The English 
Channel, the North Sea, and the geographic barriers around the French Hexagon 
established bounded spaces within which “social learning” on an unprecedented scale 
could occur. Once these new communications technologies have been taken into account, 
national differences in social rules and organizational forms have little further explanatory 
power to explain economic growth. 
Third, the theory should explain why the many cooperative innovations – new technologies 
with more than one principal – during this period were all developed in three urban clusters 
in central Britain, northern France and the northeastern United States. These 
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breakthroughs, which required inputs from two or more individuals – for example, the 
atmospheric steam engine, industrial chemicals and interchangeable parts – each had a 
much greater growth impact than comparable single-inventor technologies. The simplest 
explanation is that these clusters were the networks within which the first two national 
standardized languages spread rapidly, due to repeated interaction between actors from the 
component urban nodes. Individuals from different backgrounds and places of origin could 
therefore communicate with unprecedented ease and confidence. In effect, the early 
monolingual dictionaries of the English and French languages were vehicles for an “idea 
flow” that permitted the synthesis of disparate bits of existing technology. 
There is one final question of interest. Is there a present-day equivalent to the distinction 
made in the paper between the relatively minor non-cooperative innovations that made up 
the majority of our sample and the cooperative innovations that constituted the most 
important breakthroughs? The distinctive feature of the latter was that they required the 
integration of two or more distinct areas of specialization. For example, in the development 
of the atmospheric steam engine, Thomas Newcomen was a Devon hardware merchant 
familiar with the needs of the mining industry for pumping water, whereas John Calley, his 
partner, was a plumber from the same region with experience in metal-working. Without 
the cooperation of coreligionists from the Midlands, however, their efforts would have 
been unsuccessful. Or in the case of the production of sodium carbonate from salt, Jean 
d’Arcet was a professor of chemistry from south-western France and Nicolas Leblanc a 
surgeon from central France with an interest in practical applications. If these examples are 
pertinent, any barriers to the flow of ideas may prove harmful to innovation and growth. 
Moreover, urban regions with two or more important industries, or with both basic and 
applied research centers, may have a significant comparative advantage in promoting 
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Figure 3.  Innovating cities during the Industrial Revolution, 1700-1850 
















































Table 1. Summary statistics 
       
  Total Mean 
Standard 
deviation Maximum Minimum 
All innovations 1700-1749 13 0.05 0.38 5 0 
 1750-1799 53 0.21 1.19 13 0 
 1800-1849 51 0.20 1.18 13 0 
 Total 117 0.47 2.28 21 0 
Cooperative 1700-1749 4 0.02 0.20 3 0 
 1750-1799 23 0.09 0.77 11 0 
 1800-1849 27 0.11 0.63 8 0 
 Total 54 0.22 1.32 15 0 
Non-cooperative 1700-1749 9 0.04 0.23 2 0 
 1750-1799 30 0.12 0.62 7 0 
 1800-1849 24 0.10 0.66 9 0 
 Total 63 0.25 1.19 13 0 
Population ('000) 1700  21 51 575 6 
 1850  58 166 2236 2 
Change  1700-1850  37 124 1661 -28 
Dictionary year   1768 77 1897 1658 
Capital city   0.06 0.24 1 0 
Coal   0.14 0.35 1 0 
Port   0.23 0.42 1 0 
Literacy   33 13 50 10 
Sources: City population: Bairoch et al. (1988), as revised by Voigtländer and Voth (2013).   
Coal: Barraclough (1984; 201, 210-211). 
Country population: Maddison (2007). 
Innovations: see footnote 7. 













Table 2. Correlation coefficients between language standardization, innovation and  
urban population growth, 1700-1849, by 50-year periods 
 All innovations Cooperative Non-cooperative 
Language standardization 0.177 0.155 0.158 
Population increase 0.551 0.584 0.381 




Table 3. Factors influencing innovation rates, 1700-1849 
 All innovations Cooperative Non-cooperative 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Number of innovations: 
 
   
Standardized language 0.0150*** 0.0187*** 0.0101*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0021) 
    
Population in 1700 0.00260*** 0.00169*** 0.00296*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
    
Coal deposits 0.808*** 0.805*** 0.970** 
 (0.0380) (0.0606) (0.3654) 
    
1750-1799 1.020*** 1.261*** 0.806** 
 (0.2160) (0.0314) (0.2549) 
    
1800-1849 0.748*** 0.711*** 0.499 
 (0.1895) (0.0375) (0.2932) 
    
Constant -1.270*** -1.407*** -1.842*** 
 (0.1967) (0.1493) (0.1467) 
Inflation of zeros: 
 
   
Lagged no. of innovations -13.74 -23.09*** -29.91*** 
 (8.1875) (1.0885) (2.3005) 
    
Capital -14.01*** 24.88*** -16.44*** 
 (2.5844) (5.6551) (0.9053) 
    
Population in 1700 -0.0383*** -0.0610*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0122) (0.0117) 
    
Great Britain -1.024 -0.939 -1.425 
 (0.9660) (1.2954) (0.9265) 
    
France 0.301 3.233** -0.238 
 (0.9691) (1.1652) (0.9197) 
    
Constant 2.947** 4.102** 3.008** 
 (1.0130) (1.4459) (1.0275) 
    
lnalpha -0.441 -1.714*** -0.217 
 (0.2693) (0.5180) (0.1569) 
N 753 753 753 
Log likelihood -169.4 -71.70 -134.7 
Zero inflated binomial regressions 
Dependent variable: number of innovations in city during 50-year period. 





Table 4. Factors influencing urban population growth, 1700-1849 – all innovations 
 One-stage estimation Two-stage estimation 
 Fixed effects Complete Fixed effects Complete 
 (1) (2) (31) (4) 
All innovations:     
In given city 32.34*** 25.58*** 86.83*** 67.04*** 
 (1.4457) (1.5585) (3.4288) (2.6134) 
     
In other cities 1.043 1.544* 0.156 1.223** 
 (0.4094) (0.3842) (0.1628) (0.2270) 
     
Population in1700  0.509**  0.103 
  (0.1039)  (0.0737) 
     
Coal  3.271  -5.899 
  (2.0299)  (5.0138) 
     
Capital city  20.53*  13.13** 
  (5.1081)  (2.5575) 
     
Great Britain  -31.53  -42.41** 
  (11.6257)  (6.8942) 
     
France  -11.12  -15.18* 
  (4.3521)  (4.6013) 
     
French Revolution -596.0*** -527.2*** -503.1*** -383.8*** 
 (13.5337) (26.4912) (6.9912) (28.8213) 
     
1750-1799  -12.17  -14.58 
  (9.2098)  (9.1554) 
     
1800-1849  9.590  2.611 
  (5.9124)  (5.3402) 
     
Constant 0.967 -5.065 -1.768 5.938 
 (2.6224) (4.1313) (1.5361) (7.6859) 
N 753 753 753 753 
R2 0.284 0.564 0.627 0.705 
adj. R2 0.281 0.559 0.625 0.701 
Dependent variable: change in population of given city over 50-year period 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 5. Factors influencing urban population growth, 1700-1849 - cooperative and non-
cooperative innovations 
 One-stage estimation Two-stage estimation 
 Fixed effects Complete Fixed effects Complete 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cooperative innovations:     
In given city 51.83*** 38.17** 102.1*** 90.83*** 
 (5.5296) (6.6492) (3.9758) (3.1218) 
     
In other cities 3.532* 2.922* 0.871 2.764* 
 (0.9707) (0.7533) (0.8224) (0.8659) 
Non-cooperative innovations:     
In given city 2.279 8.120 1.319** 0.441* 
 (2.3540) (3.4387) (0.2139) (0.1207) 
     
In other cities -2.205 -1.317 0.244** 0.0785 
 (2.3433) (1.5391) (0.0318) (0.0780) 
     
Population in1700  0.496*  0.259* 
  (0.1130)  (0.0898) 
     
Coal  3.864  -3.676 
  (2.3997)  (3.9410) 
     
Capital city  22.87**  24.23** 
  (4.7055)  (3.8073) 
     
Great Britain  -18.61*  -27.15 
  (6.6384)  (12.2823) 
     
France  4.978  -15.68 
  (8.2797)  (6.5568) 
     
French Revolution -433.6*** -461.5** -332.2*** -230.4** 
 (9.8389) (54.5231) (1.8284) (40.9560) 
     
1750-1799  -1.619  -14.87 
  (3.0328)  (10.0645) 
     
1800-1849  13.43*  3.293 
  (3.8997)  (4.8083) 
     
Constant 8.690 -8.811* 0.805 2.785 
 (6.7874) (2.6612) (2.7685) (7.2483) 
N 753 753 753 753 
R2 0.349 0.581 0.714 0.772 
adj. R2 0.345 0.574 0.712 0.768 
Dependent variable: change in population of given city over 50-year period 





Table 6. Robustness: Impact of all innovations on urban population growth  
           One-stage estimation          Two-stage estimation**              No. of 
Core variables Mean FracSigni Frac+ Mean FracSigni Frac+ obs. 
Great Britain -3.46 0.75 0.5 -9.66 0.75 0.25 16 
France -7.38 0.5 0 -12.31 0.5625 0 16 
French Revolution -445.67 1 0 -352.60 1 0 16 
1750-1749 -4.77 0 0.5 -7.23 0 0.25 16 
1800-1849 16.25 0.25 1 10.80 0.25 1 16 
Population in1700 0.61 1 1 0.41 0.75 1 16 
Tested variables Mean FracSigni Frac+ Mean FracSigni Frac+  
Innovations:        
     In same city 26.03 1 1 62.92 1 1 8 
     In other cities* 1.67 1 1 1.86 1 1 8 
Coal 5.63 0 1 1.56 0 0.5 8 
Capital city 20.38 1 1 17.57 1 1 8 
  * of same country. 
** using the specifications in Table 3, column (1). 
 
Table 7. Robustness: Impact of cooperative and non-cooperative innovations on urban population 
growth 
       One-stage estimation       Two-stage estimation**          No. of 
Core variables Mean FracSigni Frac+ Mean FracSigni Frac+ obs. 
Great Britain -3.98 0.64 0.41 -6.53 0.50 0.38 64 
France -2.18 0 0.22 -9.76 0.44 0 64 
French Revolution -446.12 1 0 -381.11 1 0 64 
1750-1749 -1.87 0.06 0.44 -7.75 0.13 0.25 64 
1800-1849 16.84 0.81 1 13.75 0.13 1 64 
Population in1700 0.58 1 1 0.52 1 1 64 
Tested variables Mean FracSigni Frac+ Mean FracSigni Frac+  
Coop. innovations:        
     In same city 27.79 1 1 44.51 1 1 48 
     In other cities* 2.98 1 1 3.67 1 1 32 
Non-coop. innov.:        
     In same city 13.66 0.58 0.83 3.64 0.67 0.88 48 
     In other cities* -0.22 0 0 0.01 0 0.56 32 
Coal 5.03 0.19 1 4.36 0 1 32 
Capital city 21.04 1 1 22.94 1 1 32 
  * of same country. 
** using the specifications in Table 3, columns (1) and (2). 
